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Showing posts with label steve ballmer. Show all posts
Showing posts with label steve ballmer. Show all posts

Thursday, August 7, 2008

Microsoft Makes Case for Online Push


Ballmer Plans to Bulk Up Technology, Marketing And Pursue Acquisitions


Microsoft Corp. Chief Executive Steve Ballmer tried to put a good face on the software maker's failed attempt to buy Yahoo Inc. and pressed the case for Microsoft's continued investment in online services -- particularly Internet search.

Microsoft also said it reached an agreement with Facebook Inc. to link its Internet-search service with the social-networking Web site. The agreement is an extension of an existing relationship between the two companies.

Mr. Ballmer's comments came at Microsoft's annual meeting with analysts at its headquarters in Redmond, Wash. He and other executives devoted much of the meeting to addressing investor concerns about Microsoft's Internet business. Central to his strategy, Mr. Ballmer said, will be boosting spending on online-related technologies and marketing, and on buying other companies.

"We're going to have to ante up in a significant way to even be in this game," Mr. Ballmer said.

Microsoft spent most of this year trying to strike a deal with Yahoo -- first trying to buy the whole company and then trying to buy its Internet-search business -- but that quest ended when Yahoo rejected Microsoft's offers. On Wednesday, Microsoft said Kevin Johnson, the executive in charge of the division that houses its online business, will leave Microsoft and that it will reorganize the division.

Mr. Ballmer Thursday said that Microsoft didn't want to buy Yahoo "at the wrong price" and noted that the inability to reach an agreement in the spring made it impossible to start a regulatory review of any deal before a new U.S. president took office. He also said that buying Yahoo would have created "huge integration overhead" to merge the two companies.

Without Yahoo, he said, Microsoft will have more flexibility to try to attack Google Inc. with new technologies and acquisitions in Internet search. "I'm not going to say it's not a big bet. It is. I'm not going to say it's not risky. It is," he said.

Investing in search is important, he said, because it is a foundation for creating other consumer Internet services.

"Search is one of the starting points on the Internet," Mr. Ballmer said. "It's the best place to distribute new Internet services to the consumer."

Under the relationship with Facebook, U.S. users of the site will be able to search the Internet using Microsoft's search service, called Live Search.

The partnership gives Microsoft the exclusive right to offer Web search and search ads to U.S. Facebook users. The software company already is the exclusive third-party provider of traditional banner advertising on Facebook in the U.S. and internationally, and last year bought a 1.6% stake in the start-up for $240 million.

The search service will start on Facebook this fall, Microsoft Senior Vice President Satya Nadella said. Financial terms weren't disclosed. It comes as the two companies had been discussing the impact of a Facebook redesign that shifted where Facebook displayed Microsoft-sold banner ads on the site.

It is unclear how much the agreement could help Microsoft boost its share of the search market, in which it is a distant third to leader Google and No. 2 Yahoo. Google has an exclusive deal to power search and search advertising on MySpace.com. Analysts have estimated that Google is losing money on the $900 million three-year deal, which expires in 2010 -- although both sides say they are pleased with the partnership.

In a separate announcement, Microsoft said it will buy DATAllegro Inc., a Silicon Valley start-up that combines software for managing what the industry calls data warehouses with computing hardware. Financial terms weren't disclosed.

By: Robert Guth and Jessica Vascellaro
Wall Street Journal; July 25, 2008

Friday, June 6, 2008

Gates & Ballmer: Still Brothers At Arms


Gates-Ballmer Clash Shaped Microsoft's Coming Handover

One of the most successful business partnerships in history was coming unraveled. It was early 2000, and Bill Gates had relinquished the chief executive's job at Microsoft Corp. to Steve Ballmer -- for the first time taking a back seat to his college pal and right-hand man of 20 years.

Mr. Ballmer got the title. But Mr. Gates retained the power, triggering a yearlong struggle between the two men that until now has remained largely under wraps.

Things became so bitter that, on one occasion, Mr. Gates stormed out of a meeting in a huff after a shouting match in which Mr. Ballmer jumped to the defense of several colleagues, according to an individual present at the time. After the exchange, Mr. Ballmer seemed "remorseful," the person said.

The conflict between the two men paralyzed business-strategy decisions that the company still wrestles with today. Board members stepped in to try to mediate a truce.

The differences between the two men ended, Mr. Gates and other Microsoft executives say, when in 2001 Mr. Gates had an epiphany, recognizing he needed to accept his role as No. 2. "I had to change," Mr. Gates says.

On June 27, Mr. Gates will fully step aside from management at Microsoft, ending daily work there to focus on philanthropy. If the transition goes smoothly, it will be in large part because the clash eight years ago forced the two men to grapple with the crucial question of whether Mr. Gates can let his friend run the company unencumbered. Microsoft used the lessons of that crisis as it planned for the ultimate succession.

Read edited excerpts from The Wall Street Journal's interview with Bill Gates and Steve Ballmer, as the Microsoft executives talk to staff reporter Robert Guth about their relationship, Mr. Gates's transition and the future of the company.

This summer, Mr. Ballmer moves into the corner office inhabited for years by Mr. Gates, who will work only one day a week and serve as board chairman.

Once Mr. Gates leaves, "I'm not going to need him for anything. That's the principle," Mr. Ballmer says. "Use him, yes, need him, no."

The handover marks the end to a storied business partnership that created a new industry, spawned many millionaires, and redefined how the world uses computers. Under Mr. Gates, Microsoft also fought one of the most heated antitrust battles in U.S. history and created the personal fortune that he is now deploying against global problems such as AIDS.


Mr. Ballmer's challenge is to assure that Microsoft's best days aren't behind it. The company faces one of the widest sets of obstacles in its 33-year history, as nimble rivals try to chip away its traditional software business and broad industry shifts force it to build entirely new businesses. To repel rising titans like Google Inc., Microsoft is taking unprecedented steps, such as its recent bid for Yahoo Inc. Although that effort is now shelved, it would have been the software company's largest acquisition.

Elder Statesman

Messrs. Ballmer and Gates are attempting a tricky feat by navigating an "ambassadorial succession" -- when a founder steps aside but still makes himself available as an elder statesman, says Yale School of Management Professor Jeffrey Sonnenfeld. They have had eight years of rehearsal, but the approach still has its perils: History is riddled with company founders who stifle their creation when they don't entirely break free.

Mr. Gates and Steve Ballmer introduced the Windows Vista operating software in January 2007 in New York.

In addition, if Microsoft later needs radical change, it would be rare that loyal insiders like Mr. Ballmer can "really tear into their inheritance," says Joseph L. Bower, Baker Foundation Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School.

The weight of the transfer on the two men -- both 52 years old, and so close they often complete each other's sentences -- was clear at a March retreat of Microsoft's top executives. Mr. Ballmer gave the opening remarks to the group, his eyes streaming with tears as he noted that it would be the last such meeting with Mr. Gates and Jeff Raikes, a veteran executive and friend who is joining Mr. Gates's philanthropy.

Last month, in a joint interview with Mr. Gates, Mr. Ballmer's eyes welled up as the two men talked about building Microsoft. "It is a little like giving birth to something. Bill gave birth but I was kind of an early nanny in raising this child," Mr. Ballmer said. "There are fun things we get to do together, that's all nice. I mean, it's important, but this is..."

"...this is what we did," said Mr. Gates, smiling.

Their relationship started at Harvard University in the mid-1970s, where the two played poker and thrived by pushing their intellectual limits. Once they skipped a graduate economics class for the entire semester, then teamed up a few days before the final exam to try to learn the material all at once. Mr. Ballmer recalls he got a 97; Mr. Gates a 99.

Elements of their early friendship -- competition and hard work -- defined Microsoft's own culture. Mr. Gates focused on technology and business strategy, while Mr. Ballmer took on diverse roles. Among other things, he was Microsoft's first business manager, and managed development of the first version of Windows and North American sales. Later, he expanded Microsoft world-wide.

Even as the company grew, the two men could jointly manage almost every aspect of the business. "For a certain size organization, it was beautiful," Mr. Gates says.

Their tight relationship allowed for heated arguments that would quickly subside. Indeed, numerous executives say this was a key part of the decision-making culture.

Their centralized management of the company started to break down in the late 1990s as Microsoft grew in complexity. The U.S. Department of Justice alleged that Microsoft had abused its monopoly, and the company fought to keep from being split up. It faced an onslaught of competitors and was rankled by the threat posed by the Internet and the flight of Microsoft's employees to Web start-ups.

Embattled, Mr. Gates sought help. Eventually, in January 2000, he gave his chief executive title to Mr. Ballmer. Mr. Gates became Microsoft's "chief software architect," a new position that, in theory, was below that of Mr. Ballmer.

Soon, the two men clashed as Mr. Ballmer tried to assert himself in his new job. As the firm's iconic leader, Mr. Gates still held sway that wasn't tied to a title: In meetings Mr. Gates would interject with sarcasm, undermining Mr. Ballmer in front of other executives, Mr. Gates and other Microsoft executives say.

Debates spanned various subjects -- personnel decisions, the Xbox videogame machine then being developed, and even the future of Microsoft's core Windows software, Microsoft executives said.

Some major decisions got stuck due to the impasse, Messrs. Gates and Ballmer said. In one case, two vice presidents clashed over the future of NetDocs, a promising effort to offer software programs such as word processing over the Internet. The issue: Because NetDocs risked cannibalizing sales of Microsoft's cash-cow Office programs, some executives wanted NetDocs killed.

Messrs. Gates and Ballmer were unable to settle on a plan. First, NetDocs ballooned to a 400-person staff, then it got folded into the Office group in early 2001, where it died.

Other Microsoft executives tried to step in, calling Messrs. Gates and Ballmer into a meeting with a clear message: Your struggles threaten the company, according to people familiar with the situation.

Board's Concerns

Microsoft's board held its own discussions with the two men, and also dispatched Dave Marquardt, a director and early Microsoft investor, to have periodic dinners with the two to help sort through the troubles.

"The board was really concerned about what was going to happen," says Jon Shirley, a former Microsoft president who sits on the company's board.

The stress on Mr. Ballmer was clear one morning in January 2001 while he was in Paris for an annual review of Microsoft's businesses. In his hotel room at 3 a.m. after a long day of meetings, Mr. Ballmer posed a telling question to Mr. Raikes, the veteran Microsoft executive: "What is the CEO's job at Microsoft?"

At the urging of the board and their wives, Mr. Gates and Mr. Ballmer agreed in February 2001 to work out their differences over dinner at the Polaris restaurant in the Bellevue Club Hotel a few miles from Microsoft's campus. The two men declined to discuss details of that meeting, saying only that they needed to sort out their roles, with Mr. Gates as the "junior partner" to Mr. Ballmer's "senior partner."

Mr. Gates concluded that it was he who needed to change most. "Steve is all about being on the team, and being committed to the mutual goals," Mr. Gates said. "So I had to figure out, what are my behaviors that don't reinforce that? What is it about sarcasm in a meeting?" he said. "Or just going, 'This is completely screwed up'?"

Mr. Ballmer says that, as the top executive, he had to learn when to override decisions and when to just "let things go," he said. "We got it figured out," he said.

Soon, Mr. Gates started to hold back negative comments in meetings. During one deliberation among the executives who reported directly to Mr. Ballmer, Mr. Gates deferred to Mr. Ballmer on an important decision, prompting Microsoft executives to silently glance at each other with surprise, recalls Microsoft Vice President Mich Matthews.

Making an Imprint

Gradually, Mr. Ballmer made his imprint. He restructured the company to give more decision-making power to executives, and elevated people with general management experience into positions previously held by technology-focused executives. He also worked to settle Microsoft's many lawsuits, taking a more conciliatory line than Mr. Gates typically had, Microsoft executives say.

Mr. Gates, meantime, focused on guiding Microsoft's long-term technology strategy. Among other projects, he coached three younger managers on how to build a case for Microsoft's entry into business-communications software. That work was later launched as a major new business in "unified communications," or merging email, voice mail and other business communications.

In 2003, Mr. Gates let Mr. Ballmer lead secret talks to buy German software maker SAP AG, while he handled the technology-planning side of the talks and provided guidance in line with his job as Microsoft's chairman, says a person familiar with the situation. (Microsoft ended up not buying the company.)

Microsoft also started laying the foundation for Mr. Gates's eventual departure, in March 2005 buying Groove Networks Inc. to bring its founder, software pioneer Ray Ozzie, in house to complement Mr. Gates as a technology guru. Mr. Gates once described Mr. Ozzie -- known as the father of Lotus Notes information-sharing software -- as "one of the top five programmers in the universe."

Messrs. Gates and Ballmer had settled into their new roles by early 2006, when Mr. Gates decided to end full-time work at Microsoft, setting a two-year timeline for making the move.

One concern for Mr. Ballmer was how to preserve Mr. Gates's role of technology visionary inside the company. Looking for guidance, Mr. Ballmer says he cracked open a book from his college years by Max Weber, the German sociologist, on how organizations handle the disappearance of "charismatic leaders."

On March 28, 2006, Mr. Ballmer described the book to Microsoft's board at a retreat in the San Juan Islands near Seattle, Microsoft executives say. One way for a firm to retain the charisma of a departing leader, Mr. Weber wrote some 100 years ago, is for the leader to name his own replacement.

Mr. Gates did just that. In June 2006, he named his own two successors as tech czars: Craig Mundie, one of Mr. Gates's chief technical advisers, and Mr. Ozzie, the programmer.

"The world has had a tendency to focus a disproportionate amount of attention on me," Mr. Gates said at the time of the announcement. He then gave his successors some elbow room, disappearing on a seven-week sabbatical that included a trip to Africa.

In an interview at that time, Mr. Ballmer compared their relationship to that of brothers. "I think brothers tend to argue a lot, and somehow they stay brothers and stay connected," he said. "I think Bill and I have figured out how to do all of that."

Aborted Yahoo Bid

Leading into this year, evidence that the transfer of power has taken hold is in Microsoft's now-aborted bid for Yahoo. Buying Yahoo could have helped Microsoft expand its online-advertising business and build online versions of its personal-computer software -- the same transition it attempted with NetDocs, the project that died back in 2001. But at a price tag of nearly $50 billion in cash and stock, the bid had its risks and would have been the largest acquisition by far at a company that hasn't done many large deals.

Mr. Gates stayed largely on the sidelines, and notes that it was Mr. Ballmer behind the bid, tapping Mr. Ozzie to sort through how the two companies would merge their technologies.

Some Microsoft insiders say Mr. Gates -- who traditionally favored Microsoft building its own way into markets -- wasn't a major proponent of the deal. Whatever the case, Mr. Gates stands by his man. "I don't have a different point of view on the Yahoo thing than Steve does," he said.

The question remains if Mr. Gates can resist the temptation to dive back in if Microsoft hits a crisis point. Over the past decade, several high-profile founders jumped back in when their companies were under siege, including Steve Jobs, who remade Apple Inc., and Michael Dell of Dell Inc. and Howard Schultz of Starbucks Corp. "There is a savior complex that says, 'I'm the only one who can restore it to its glory,'" says David A. Nadler, senior partner at consulting firm Oliver Wyman Group.

Mr. Gates says he's happy to help on some long-term projects, but won't return full-time. "I am done with that," he said.

By: Robert Guth
Wall Street Journal; June 5, 2008

Tuesday, May 13, 2008

Jerry Yang's Scorched Earth


Congratulations to Steve Ballmer. Not many CEOs would have the nerve – humility, cold-bloodedness, whatever – to float a gotta-have takeover offer, then back away over the difference between $33 and $37 a share.

Not many CEOs would have been willing nakedly to advertise strategic vulnerability and faulty execution vis-a-vis a rival like Google, then fail to consummate the deal marketed to investors as the remedy for that vulnerability and faulty execution.

Even more so because of Mr. Ballmer's Murdochian approach: He came at Yahoo with a rich 62% premium designed to foreclose a rival suitor and confront the Yahoo board with a choice of accepting Microsoft's terms or serving up a big ugly stock price drop to Yahoo's suffering shareholders. By laying such a dramatic premium on the table, he also sent a message to his own Microsoft shareholders that said: "This is the only way I see forward."

But Mr. Ballmer didn't count on Jerry Yang, whose idea of what his company was worth became inflated by the perception that Microsoft needed it so much. When Mr. Yang said Microsoft's offer "undervalued" Yahoo, he meant it underestimated Yahoo's value to Microsoft, not to anybody else.

In a fashion, he outsmarted not only Mr. Ballmer but his own Yahoo shareholders and board. Having discovered how much Yahoo was worth to Redmond (and no one else), he set about destroying that unique value by ceding Yahoo's position in search to Google through an outsourcing deal.

All this so Jerry Yang can fulfill his dream of having an independent Yahoo whose halls he can continue to walk as the revered "founder."

Luckily for him, the media are too busy obsessing about the severance dished out to various Wall Street executives to make him the new poster boy for high-handed, unaccountable CEOs.

For his part, Mr. Ballmer's retreat was a rarer sort of act. Yahoo's value to Microsoft, after all, was as a weapon to impede Google's assault on Microsoft's core business, for which Microsoft could afford to pay almost any price.

A Yahoo acquisition would have allowed Microsoft to buy a position in Web eyeballs with which to attack Google's margins if not Google's market share. In turn, Google would have to think twice about throwing money regardless of potential return (as Microsoft itself was known to do) at undermining a rival's business model.

It was a plausible strategy. Then again, Microsoft might have ended up spending years and billions to build a Maginot Line.

Post-Yahoo, Mr. Ballmer says his company's counter-Google strategy remains intact; it will just be slower-going without Yahoo. But Microsoft here is perhaps showing too little imagination – or throwing up a smokescreen.

The alternative? The bravest would be to spin off Windows. Vista, its latest output, was not a triumph, even if Microsoft claims to be content with sales of the new operating system sold so far. InfoWorld, a magazine of corporate technology managers, has collected thousands of online signatures begging Microsoft to delay retiring its previous Windows version, XP, without which they'll be forced to upgrade and buy expensive new computers they don't want.

A liberated Windows unit could concentrate on developing the more streamlined and diverse operating system products the market wants (some of which could be supported by advertising), and it would still be a fabulous business for Microsoft shareholders. Meanwhile, the other Microsoft could devote itself wholeheartedly to building application businesses for the Web age, even an Office-based network for delivering ads and other services in competition with Google. With its $26 billion cash pile, Microsoft could set itself up as the host for an array of cutting-edge Web services being created by new start-ups, rather than trying to outgoogle Google in the search market.

Moral victories don't count for much with the stock market, but let's give Mr. Ballmer his moral victory. Big Yahoo investors like Capital Research's Gordon Crawford are slinging spitballs at Mr. Yang. Mr. Yang, in legal jeopardy, is spinning a tale about how Microsoft was the one that botched a deal. Yahoo's future as an "independent" company would seem to mean vassalhood to Google.

But "I told you so" doesn't brace up the Windows/Office fortress or throw a banana peel under an advancing Google. More interesting than Yahoo's fade to irrelevance (see you in Delaware Chancery Court!) will be Mr. Ballmer's Plan B.


By: Holman Jenkins, Jr.
Wall Street Journal; May 7, 2008

Thursday, April 10, 2008

Microsoft Ratchets Up Deal Pressure on Yahoo


Ballmer Threatens to Launch A Hostile Bid if Internet Firm Doesn't Agree to Merger Soon

Microsoft Corp. is turning the screws to try to force Yahoo Inc. to agree to a takeover, but Yahoo remains focused on finding an alternative.

In a letter sent Saturday to Yahoo directors, Microsoft Chief Executive Steve Ballmer threatened a hostile takeover bid for the Internet company if it doesn't agree to a merger within the next three weeks. On Sunday, Yahoo was planning a written response to the letter, saying Microsoft had failed to address antitrust concerns and other issues raised by its offer, according to people familiar with the matter. The offer is currently valued at $42.2 billion.

Yahoo's reluctance to negotiate has given some Microsoft executives a window to voice their opposition to the proposed acquisition, say people familiar with the matter. Their skepticism probably wouldn't derail a possible deal, but it could at least limit Microsoft's appetite for raising its offer, these people say.

Some in Yahoo's camp view Mr. Ballmer's latest move as a negotiating strategy, and they believe there is still time for Yahoo to pursue alternatives to an acquisition by the software giant, say people familiar with the matter. One of the people says some members of Yahoo's management would prefer not to sell to Microsoft and are still looking for another deal that would allow Yahoo to avoid that.

The company's directors were scheduled to discuss the matter Sunday, but it wasn't clear, whether they came to any new conclusions.

On Jan. 31, Microsoft offered to acquire Yahoo for $44.6 billion, or $31 a share in cash and stock Yahoo's board rejected the offer, which has sin< declined in value to $29.36 a share because of substantial drop in Microsoft's share price. In p.m. trading Friday on the Nasdaq Stock Mark Yahoo's shares were up 23 cents at $28.36, who Microsoft's traded at $29.16, up 16 cents.

Since the unsolicited offer, Yahoo has been discussing alternative arrangements with companies that including News Corp. and Time Warn Inc. People familiar with the matter say the talks with Time Warner, which center around its folding its AOL Internet unit into Yahoo in return for a significant Yahoo stake, have heated up recently. The separate Yahoo discussions with News Corp., owner of Wall Street Journal publisher Dow Jones & Co., have cooled, these people say.

It's unclear how much patience Yahoo's shareholders might have for a drawn out pursuit of non- Microsoft options, or taste for deals that might represent less-certain financial returns than Microsoft's stock-and-cash offer. But one person familiar with the matter says there is some frustration that Yahoo's delay might have caused it to lose leverage in negotiating a higher offer from Microsoft.

Microsoft has been keeping close tabs on the views of Yahoo's major shareholders and, with Saturday's letter, it appears to be betting that investors want Yahoo to begin negotiations. Microsoft believes that a recent series of presentations that Yahoo management made to investors failed to persuade them that the company is worth substantially more than what Microsoft has offered.

If Yahoo's board doesn't agree to a sale in three weeks, Microsoft would be "compelled" to take its offer directly to shareholders and wage a proxy fight to replace Yahoo's directors, Mr. Ballmer wrote in his letter to Yahoo directors. He also implied that the offer Microsoft would make after the deadline would be lower than the one now on the table.

The amount of time any hostile effort would take is unclear, because Yahoo has so-called poison pill provisions designed to thwart hostile takeovers. Microsoft would presumably have to persuade shareholders to vote for its alternative slate of directors at Yahoo's annual meeting, for which Yahoo has yet to fix a date. If elected, those pro- Microsoft directors could then remove Yahoo's poison pill and accept Microsoft's offer. Under the law in Delaware, where Yahoo is incorporated, it could be forced to hold its annual meeting if it hasn't already done so by July.

Mr. Ballmer's letter, which comes after senior executives from the two companies failed to make any headway in two separate meetings in recent weeks, may make a friendly resolution of the standoff less likely. The sharply worded letter makes no secret of Microsoft's frustration at the lack of progress and could end up alienating Yahoo's board and management, some of whom already regard the software maker with a degree of suspicion.

In his letter, Mr. Ballmer suggests that worsening economic conditions have reduced Yahoo's market value, adding that "by any fair measure, the large premium we offered in January is even more significant today." Microsoft's original $31 per share offer represented a 62% premium to where Yahoo's shares had been trading before the offer.

Many Yahoo shareholders have been holding out for a higher offer and it is unlikely they would embrace a deal for less than the original bid. Still, Mr. Ballmer's threat underscores the frustration on the part of the software maker with the lack of any progress

The offer for Yahoo has generated some opposition within Microsoft, say people familiar with the situation. The plan to bid for the company was kept secret among a limited group of executives and advisers driving the strategy. Many other Microsoft executives learned of it only after Microsoft made the offer to Yahoo's board on Jan. 31.

Drivers of the deal at Microsoft include Senior Vice President Yusuf Mehdi and Senior Vice President Hank Vigil, two executives whose roles are to map out strategy and negotiate deals; they don't manage business groups.

If a deal with Yahoo goes through, Messrs. Mehdi and Vigil stand to play key roles in guiding the integration of the companies and could have greater clout to pursue other deals.

But other Microsoft executives have been raising concerns about the risks in buying Yahoo, say people familiar with the matter. Among the issues they have raised to other Microsoft executives and outsiders is the huge challenge of merging the two companies' computer systems that handle functions such as graphical display advertisements on Web sites. The skeptics argue that Microsoft should continue to build its online systems and services - a strategy that so far has fallen short of Microsoft's expectations - and make a number of smaller acquisitions complement that effort.

Another worry among some insiders is who would lead the complex integration. Microsoft has limited experience in digesting very large acquisitions and las recently lost several executives who might have helped in that undertaking.

Such opposition, say some people, is to be expected in a deal the size that Microsoft is pursuing with Yahoo. Microsoft also has a culture that allows debate to thrive - sometimes at the expense of making timely decisions. At this point, doubts about the deal don't seem strong enough to scuttle it, say the people familiar with the matter.

"There is no dissension among the people who are making the decisions," said one person close to Microsoft. This person said top executives including Mr. Ballmer have been level-headed since the start about the challenges and risks of completing such an acquisition.

By: Kevin Delaney, Robert Guth, and Matthew Karnitschnig
Wall Street Journal; April 7, 2008

Straight Talk for Ballmer From One Yahoo Holder

Steve Ballmer
Chief Executive
Microsoft Corp.

Dear Steve:

As a Yahoo shareholder, I have reviewed your most recent letter with regard to the unsolicited proposal you made to acquire Yahoo on Jan. 31.

I have carefully considered your unsolicited proposal and have concluded that it is in the best interest of Yahoo shareholders for Microsoft to buy Yahoo.

I understand that our board has been actively and expeditiously exploring strategic alternatives to maximize shareholder value. Frankly, that effort has been a big disappointment to many of us. After hitting $30, Yahoo shares have drifted to $27 and change this week. Despite Yahoo's 305 million unique monthly users, no one else has stepped up with an offer. No one is more disappointed than I am that no bidding war erupted.

At this point, I've given up hope that some white knight will emerge. All we shareholders have heard about is talks with News Corp., now apparently over, and with Time Warner's AOL. (News Corp. is the owner of The Wall Street Journal publisher Dow Jones & Co.) I'm sure you and your Microsoft colleagues are quaking in fear at the competitive threat from a combined Yahoo-AOL. AOL has already dragged down one once great corporation. Why should we be next?

Let's talk about the real threat here: Google. I'm a Google shareholder, too, which is fortunate for me since Google has eaten Yahoo's lunch in search -- yours, too, for that matter. Yahoo's board and top executives are pinning their hopes on growth in search and on display/video advertising. But even if those markets grow, Google has been steadily expanding its lead in search. Now that it owns DoubleClick, it will be a formidable threat in display/video as well.

These businesses depend on scale, but not just on sheer size, which is something people running Yahoo either don't grasp or don't want to talk about. Google's searches are more effective for both searchers and advertisers, which is why it keeps gaining share. Yahoo has 262 million email users, which gives users a reason to return to the site and is surely valuable to Microsoft. But beyond that, there's little to deter Yahoo users from migrating to other sites.

I realize that you recently received a letter from Yahoo CEO Jerry Yang and Chairman Roy Bostock very similar in tone to this one, but reaching the opposite conclusion. Don't listen to them. I'm sure they know their options are running out. I also hear there's been grumbling from people inside Microsoft. Don't listen to them, either. You need to do something with the $37.8 billion in current assets sitting on Microsoft's balance sheet. In fact, you'd get no complaint from me if you made your bid all cash.

So there can be no confusion, let me reiterate that my goal is to maximize shareholder value. I have no desire for a drawn-out hostile bid, and you will generate no goodwill whatsoever if you carry out your threat to lower your offer. You previously offered $31 a share. All of us understand that no one makes their highest bid first, so why don't you tell us what you're really prepared to pay, and we'll call it a deal.

Very truly yours,
James B. Stewart

James B. Stewart, a columnist for SmartMoney magazine and SmartMoney.com, writes weekly about his personal investing strategy. Unlike Dow Jones reporters, he may have positions in the stocks he writes about. For his past columns, see: www.smartmoney.com/commonsense.



By: James B. Stewart
Wall Street Journal; April 9, 2008